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A PROCEDURE MODEL FOR EVALUATING IT-SECURITY 
INVESTMENTS 
 
Безпека інформаційних систем у теперішній час є життєво важливим фактором для компаній. 
Багато різних вимірів, від технічних до організаційних, є доступними для досягнення прийн-
ятного рівня безпеки. У недалекому минулому було розроблено методи підтримки прийняття 
рішень при оцінюванні прибутковості інвестицій у IT-безпеку. Проте інтегральні процедурні 
моделі для повного управління IT-безпекою до цього часу не знайдені - ані у літературі, ані 
на практиці. У цієї статті ми пропонуємо середовище, яке дає можливість аналізувати ре-
зультати альтернативних інвестицій у безпеку з точки зору, орієнтованої на процеси. Ми 
здійснили поглиблений аналіз сучасного стану справ у галузях синхронізації IT та бізнесу та 
управління IT-безпекою з метою ідентифікувати прийнятні концепції для цього середовища. 
Спеціальну увагу приділено вимогам до IT-безпеки критичних бізнес-процесів. 
 
The security of information systems is a vital factor for companies nowadays. In order to achieve an 
adequate level of security, a variety of distinct measures is available, ranging from technical meas-
ures to organizational measures. In near past suitable methods for decision support especially for the 
assessment of the profitability of IT-security investments have been developed. But integrated 
procedure models for a complete it-security controlling can neither be found in literature nor in 
practice. With this article, we propose a method framework that enables the analysis of the results of 
alternative security investments from a process-oriented perspective. As a basis, we have conducted 
an in-deep analysis of the state-of-the-art in the fields of IT-Business-Alignment and IT-security 
management in order to identify suitable concepts for the framework. A special focus lies on the 
requirements of IT-security controlling of critical business processes. 
 
1. Introduction. The necessity for a risk management concerning IT-security 
results exempted from economic considerations just as from different standards 
and requirements, e.g. such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act [1-4]. An evidence 
thereof is the in the past above-average increase of IT-security budgets com-
pared to overall IT budgets [5]. Nether less there are just a few findings in this 
field in terms of decision support by analyzing the profitability of such meas-
ures even if necessity is broadly accepted in theory and practice [6]. Most of the 
existing work can be characterized as vague, unusable or without reference to 
concrete recommendations for a course of action [7-9]. 
The measurement of profitability for IT-security measures implies similar 
challenges as those in the field of IT investments in general. Although the IT 
productivity paradoxon has been considered as outdated for years [10; 11], 
recent studies indicate still skepticism of executives whether IT investments can 
provide an adequate value from a company’s point of view [12; 13]. This prob-
lem is even more obvious in the field of IT-security due to the fact that that the 
effects of successful measures are exclusively indirect, because they contribute 
to the reduction of (future) risks [14-16]. The statement: "IT-security functions 
have been valuable whenever nothing has happened.” [6] underlines this prob-
lem area. Moreover, it is insufficient to analyze just one measure independent, 
since there are often interdependencies among various IT-security measures and 
only a bundle of measures can be accounted for success [17]. Meanwhile this 
complexity calls for taken a detailed set of different parameters into account, 
the practical applicability calls for a simple to compute method. This conflict is 
enforced by the reciprocal expert-layman relations in this field where account-
ing is conducted by business specialists and implementation and design of 
measures by technical experts [18]. In particular, it is necessary that all relevant 
aspects from technical and business point of view are considered when provid-
ing a decision recommendation [19]. An analysis of the state-of-the art in the 
field of IT-security management illustrates that the suggested methods are either 
theoretically inexact or practically unapt [19; 20]. Traditional approaches do 
mostly not calculate the corresponding value proportion of these measures. The 
corresponding return is mandatory for the assessment of efficiency [19-21]. 
Findings in the field of IT-Business-Alignment offer the opportunity to over-
come this shortcomings, because they allow to compute the return by a combi-
nation of the business process-view and the IT-process-view [22], it has to be 
examined whether IT-Business-Alignment approaches, which explicitly con-
sider this relationship, can be adopted for the controlling of IT-security meas-
urements. Most approaches in context suppose a linear exchange relationship 
between expected loss and the costs of security measures. This procedure does 
not apply for information systems, which have vital meaning for the organiza-
tion.  
Based on these requirements, we suggest a procedure model which sup-
ports the assessment of the profitability of alternative IT-security investments. 
Essential for the design of the method framework is the observation that the 
implications of IT investments first of it all can be observed on the process level 
[23]. One topic is to integrate the methods for calculation of payments and 
disbursements for all processes which are affected by IT-security measures to a 
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generic procedure model of IT-risk management-Another is to provide decision 
support for security investments within critical infrastructures and integrate this 
into an overall IT-risk management procedure. So we define requirements in 
this context and offer an outlook to an approach for controlling security meas-
ures for critical business processes and information infrastructures (such as data 
centers). We conclude with a brief summary and an outlook on future research 
opportunities. 
 
2. IT-business alignment as a design principle for the IT Security manage-
ment 
 
2.1. Content of IT-Business-Alignment. "IT-Business-Alignment” terms the 
alignment of the IT-strategy and –infrastructure with the business-strategy and –
architecture. The goal is a sustainable creation of value for the company [24; 
25]. The term "alignment” is used varyingly in literature [26]. In this context the 
process, which aims at the achievement of the alignment, is meant [26-28]. 
Synonyms for alignments used in literature are "fit" [29; 30], "harmony" [31], 
"integration" [32], "linkage" [33]or "synergy"[34]. One main aspect in the 
alignment of the IT-perspective with the business-perspective is the security of 
the information systems as a dimension of process quality with the quality di-
mensions of security like confidentiality, availability and integrity [35]. Out of 
this, approaches of the IT-Business-alignment are used are often used in the IT-
security literature, e.g. through employing a business process orientation [22; 
36-39], or, more explicitly, through adopting various techniques of Business 
Engineering [37]. Linking IT- and Business-perspective is especially demanded 
when the efficiency of IT-security measurements is calculated [22]. Most ap-
proaches just employ pure metrics in the meaning of calculation rules for top 
key figures – the determination of the corresponding figures is still a non solved 
problem [20; 21; 40]. In the next section methods, which were explicitly devel-
oped for IT-Business-alignment, are examined concerning their fulfillment of 
the above stated requirements and their contribution to the calculation of the 
profitability of IT-security measures. Because the design and valuation of proc-
ess are of great importance to IT-Business-alignment [41; 42], it has to be 
checked, in how far decision support methods in the context of business process 
management and controlling exist and in how far these methods can be em-
ployed in alignment-projects. 
 
2.2. Decision support with process models. In earlier publications many deci-
sion support methods for IT-Business-alignment can be found. A growing im-
portance to a successful IT-Business-alignment is assigned to process models 
[26; 43], especially for approaches in the IT-security management context. In 
the latter the main process-oriented approaches out of literature will be exam-
ined concerning their applicability towards the calculation of economic effi-
ciency of IT-security measures. For this the process models have to be extended 
with further information. This should be information about costs, time and ca-
pacities. After this they can be utilized as a basis for process-controlling [19; 
44; 45]. Out of the controlling domain several approaches targeting at process-
controlling exist. These are for example approaches, where the process per-
formance is evaluated through key figures out of a number of dimensions [46-
48]. To be able to state the economic efficiency of the model, multidimensional 
performance measurement [49] is not suitable. Regarding the transparency of 
value creation, decision support methods, which provide information about 
costs or out payments, are needed. To calculate the costs based on process mod-
els, activity based costing (ABC) can be employed [44; 50; 51]. Time related 
information about costs are of great importance for short-term decisions. Be-
cause IT-Business-alignment decisions are long-term decisions, cost-oriented 
approaches are not suitable. Instead of this, in- and out payments should be used 
for evaluating alternative forms of IT-Business-alignment. Grob & vom Brocke 
developed an approach to evaluate payments based on process models [52]. The 
main principle of the method is, that the execution of single functions of a proc-
ess is connected to long-term monetary consequences. Those are consolidated 
into one financial key figure [52]. One challenge in the consolidation of these 
single payments to one series of payments comes up, when the EPC has cycles. 
With the help of statistical procedures the payments can be aggregated corre-
sponding to the process. This aggregation results in a series of payments which 
consolidates all original payments of the process. This series of payments serves 
as the interface to the calculation of financial key figures in a finance plan in-
strument called Visualization of Financial Implications (VOFI) as an instrument 
of the dynamic investment controlling [53; 54]. With its help all in- and out 
payments and the original amount of financial resources corresponding to the 
project are captured and reckoned up. The results of a VOFI can be used to 
calculate significant financial key figures. For the IT-Business-alignment these 
are especially the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) and the Return on Investment 
(ROI) [53]. This method was expanded, for example by vom Brocke for the 
Service-Oriented Process Controlling (SOPC) [55]. Before the monetary valua-
tion in the context of the use of SOA starts, a qualitative valuation to coordinate 
the infrastructure, services and activities is inserted. Trough this, only such 
alternatives that fulfill the defined minimum requirements, are evaluated [56]. 
This expandability shows that in the context of IT-security not only monetary 
but also qualitative aspects are considered in the decision process.  
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2.3. Processes as foundation of decision support in IT-security management. 
Due to the circumstance that the impacts of IT-security investment measures, 
alike all IT investments, firstly can be observed on the processes [23], the latter 
should—in analogy to business management—represent the focal point of secu-
rity management [36-39]. Process orientation in the context of security man-
agement allows an analysis of the risk potential of incidents on value adding 
activities allows for the determination of the potential losses. Measures and 
damages, etc. can be stochastically incorporated into an appropriate combination of 
fault tree and event tree analysis—while the fault tree analysis maps loss occur-
rences, their respective impacts on the processes are modeled by means of an event 
tree analysis [57]. This proceeding is known from different contexts, e.g. within 
the scope of the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) or the hazard analysis 
critical control point method [58-60]. Due to space restrictions however, the pro-
ceeding cannot be elaborated on in greater detail at this point, especially as 
there is further research demand with respect to the explicit design. 
Besides, the process models via the respective contributions for achieve-
ment and resource strain also allow for a mapping of the financial implications 
of the measures. This advance analogously takes place in the field of activity-
based costing, although due to the investment character, here payments and 
disbursements instead of costs and activities as periodical values should be in 
the focus. Also it has already been described in other contexts in the form of a 
process-oriented investment appraisal [61-63]. The decision situation of an IT-
security investment is determined, in addition to direct payments and disburse-
ments such as the alteration of the expected loss, by the need to consider all 
indirect payments which are caused by making the investment [22]. Besides, 
additional revenues should be considered also, for example resulting from an 
increase of prospects acquisition due to a visibly higher security level (e.g. an 
SSL encryption for an online shop). Similarly, different process designs cause 
different cash flows. This notion is facilitated by the explicated proceeding in 
the sense that in addition to varying packages of measures, advanced implica-
tions such as changes in productivity may be analyzed bases on different proc-
ess designs. The method of Grob and vom Brocke was already adopted for IT-
security Investments [64]. Based on the presented findings, a procedure model 
shall be introduced in the following, by means of which investment alternatives 
for IT-security measures can be assessed by the presented method.  
 
3. Procedure model for IT-risk management based on process models. 
 
3.1. Basic procedure model of IT-risk management. The IT-risk management 
deals with risks resulting from the usage of information systems in a company. 
The procedure of tasks is oriented at the general process of risk management 
[65]. In contrast, a specialized IT-security management emerged which focuses 
on a faultless service of the companies information system. The IT-security 
management traditionally focuses on the consideration of technical systems. 
Besides conceptual fuzziness existing, the analysis of threats within the scope of 
IT-security management occasionally is called risk management [66] On the 
basis of this process the advantages resulting from an integration of IT-risk und 
security management are evident Firstly the strategy and the goals of IT-risk 
management are to be determined in the context of the risk strategy [65]. Ac-
cording to these goals potential risks for the enterprise need to be identified and 
to be evaluated by an IT-risk analysis [38]. The IT-risk analysis serves as a 
basis for identifying and implementing measures for the risk governance. At 
this point it is obvious, that this can only achieved with the competence of IT-
security management. In the classical operational risk management IT-risks 
usually are identified in various categories, but often not quantified [67]. How-
ever, the quantification is only possible by the cooperation of central actors and 
decentralized security experts, since the effects of IT-risks on the business proc-
esses need to be assessed in this way [22]. The complete procedure model is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Focusing on business processes has been claimed repeatedly for the IT-
security management [36-39; 68], but has not been realized in practice yet. A 
risk governance basically can be achieved by avoiding (refraining from activi-
ties), passing (transfer, e.g. insurance), decreasing (protective and preventive 
measures) or accepting (sustaining) risks [69]. In the context of information 
systems these measures can be conducted by IT-security experts because of 
their competences [70]. Even so, an overall view has to be taken to allocate 
resources on the ideal security level from the organization’s point of view [1]. 
The risk control serves as the control of result of the risk governance and is the 
foundation for planning future measures in terms of a risk controlling. Reports 
have to be created comprehensively in accordance with the reporting duties. In 
a largely decentralized IT-security management a standardized ascertainment is 
certainly rare [1]. Furthermore proactive budgeting processes should be de-
signed which account for the defense of potential threats and ensure that no 
means are assigned after developed incidents. 
 
3.2. The procedure model for IT-risk management based on process models. 
The present procedure model will be instantiated in the following for the appli-
ance of process model. For this purpose the approach must be classified accord-
ing the general risk management process and then checked on the basis of spe-
cial requirements of IT- security. Besides, the procedure models are linked to 
 9 10
the established concepts of risk oriented process management and risk man-
agement [71-75]. The Security goals for analysis of Information Security were 
usually more or less intuitional or independently defined with the aid of stan-
dardized criteria and related questions without consideration of discrete Secu-
rity goals of company. If necessary for the planning of the security level or 
prioritization of measures it is connected to the value of relevant objects [76]. In 
consideration of immaterial nature and the complexity of value definition of 
such important for the Information system object as "Information” this proce-
dure is difficult to resolve and can have many-valued solution [77]. The process 
orientation allows both focusing on the superior business objectives, which 
identify contributions and goals of processes [36; 38; 74; 78] and using of sup-
porting IT and therefore to make decision about required kind and security 
measures. The basal security goals to define are Confidentially, Integrity and 
Availability, which also must be defined in consideration of their specification 
on the basis of requirements of business process [35].  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The processes of IT-risk management and IT-security Management 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Decision areas within the process of IT-risk management 
 
Zur Mühlen und Rosemann apply for this purpose the risk-goal-model, where 
risks are shown opposing to process goals [74]. The costs of security measures, 
IT- infrastructure, income and expected losses in case of failures, which are the 
result of business process, are also presentable in this context. So it is obvious, 
that design and costs result from goal definition also as system und security 
goals and design have to be found according to the business processes (goals). 
The different aspects of the decision situation and their interdependencies are 
illustrated in Fig. 2. The required measures could be identified, prioritized and 
realized in connection with expected costs and savings according to the pre-
sented approach by Grob and vom Brocke [52]. This approach must be im-
proved to meet the particularities by consideration of IT- security: in the fore-
ground of all considerations is the business process, goals and direct require-
ments to information systems. The attention will be focused at dependency of 
important business processes on IT- systems. It is unacceptable to take the risk 
of very seldom failure, which could have however fatal effects even if the mod-
erate expectancy value implicates this. There isn’t simple exchange relationship 
between the higher security level and the higher security price, as it often sup-
posed considered to be [77]. 
 
3.3. Refining the procedure model for critical infrastructures. Moreover, in 
most relevant IT- risk and security management frameworks there are several 
compromise classes to discern [79-82]. A criticality analysis or Business Impact 
Analysis is usually carried out within the bounds of risk identification and risk 
analysis, and on its basis there are critical business processes and the appropri-
ate information systems (critical IT-infrastructure) to be identified. Therefore, it 
is recommended to fulfill different measures planning for business processes 
and associated information systems with normal risk disposition and critical 
business processes and underlying critical IT- infrastructures (e.g. data center). 
By the information system with normal risk disposition according to the BSI 
Baseline Protection the adaption of presented approach to profitability analysis 
of process models by Grob et al. is applied [64]. It must be taken into considera-
tion, that critical infrastructure are to complex and to important, as only meas-
ures with economic aspects, but rather here the main focus is on the highest 
security level attainability. The procedure is shown on the Fig. 3.  
The critical analysis is an approach for identification of critical business 
processes [83]. The analysis tries to identify the relevance of business proc-
esses, and to analyze how the single failures can affects the whole process. If 
there are fatal consequences appeared, this process is considered to be critical. 
The "Joint Standards" are the accumulation of standards, that were published 
for the first time in 1997 by Business Continuity Institute (BCI) and Disaster 
Risk analysis Risk governance Risk monitoringRisk identification
IT-security and 
risk controlling
IT-security management 
IT security management
IT - security measures 
IT systems design 
Business process design 
Business process management
IT-security controlling 
Business process goals Costs of absence
Costs of security measuresIT- security goals
IT systems goals Costs of design alternatives
defines cost benefit analysis
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Recovery Institute International (DRII) for Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 
[80; 84]. These standards must serve as the requirements catalogue for compa-
nies in order to establish Business Continuity Management in the company. The 
BCM’s goal is to prepare the company for a crisis situation. An exemplarily 
application is described in the Report of Gartner Group [85]. In case of critical 
analysis, business processes and each information system that is to be applied 
for corresponding process are assigned to different categories. Seibold proposes 
the classification in 3 to 6 groups [83], what complies with most approaches 
from theory and praxis like IT- Baseline Protection and BIA [78-84; 86]. In his 
example he makes a classification in four classes A-D, where the processes of A 
class cause fatal consequences in one day, class B – in 3 days and the processes 
of D class have no fatal consequences at all. This classification can be described 
by a risk map [57].  
 
 
Fig. 3. Procedure model for IT-risk management regarding critical infrastructures. 
 
First of all, all business processes of the company have to be identified and 
described, moreover all connections to other processes must be identified. For 
each business process the risk potential must be identified. If business processes 
depend on other processes, their risks must be taken into consideration by risk 
evaluation until the total risk potential is identified. If the other business proc-
esses depend on analyzed process, the total risk potential of this process must be 
forwarded to corresponding processes to make the identification of the total risk 
potential possible for those processes too. The procedure model considers also 
the above-mentioned interdependence of business processes and information 
systems. But it may lead to difficult-to-resolve cycles especially if the Model 
has high interdependence of business processes and information systems. It can 
be met with established approaches of complexity management in context of 
process models [87].  
The information systems accompanying the critical commercial processes 
are called here as critical infrastructures. The other choice of measures takes 
place here is about a criterion catalogue to be configured for the isolated case. 
The most important extension to above is that particular criteria can be defined 
as absolutely necessary (so-called lethal criteria). In the case of non-fulfillment 
of one of these criteria, the necessary protection of the critical infrastructure as a 
whole is not guaranteed. The use of the criteria catalogue follows itself a proce-
dure model. The procedural model follows the procedure model of the IT-
Baseline Protection Methodology [82]. At first a danger and requirement analy-
sis should be carried out, in order to parameterize the criterion system. This 
configuration of the criterion catalogue serves to fade out superfluous elements 
of the catalogue. In the context of the assessment of the examined systems, a 
weak point analysis should be carried out. The criterion catalogue contributes to 
identify weak points to be repaired, in which it reproaches a huge number of 
measures for lethal criteria, which are not fulfilled and have thus top priority. In 
the connection, all possible measures, which can be carried out, are arranged for 
the improvement of other areas from the criterion catalogue. The choice of the 
measures to be carried out is determined in the phase of risk governance, by 
means of a modified cost-benefit-model. Trough this, only such alternatives that 
fulfill the defined minimum requirements, are part of the allowed portfolios of 
the necessary measures [56]. The portfolio, which shows the slightest TCO, is 
selected. Other (more expensive) portfolios can be taken into consideration in 
the frame of a "bargaining solution" if these don’t fulfill lethal criteria in higher 
measure. 
 
4. Outlook. With this paper, a procedure model for the decision support of IT-
security investments has been introduced. The evaluation of the state-of-the-art 
in the field of IT-security management has illustrated that existent approaches 
are either not practice oriented and hence not relevant for the practice or – as 
has been demonstrated with regard to the ROSI – lack the theoretic foundation 
and owing to an inadequate information summarization may lead to wrong 
decision recommendations. To get a methodical foundation, IT-Business-
alignment concepts where evaluated. For this, technical and methodological 
requirements were stated. Since IT-security investments primarily exhibit a 
direct impact on the organizational processes, the latter are in the focus of the 
suggested method. Starting from an integrated view on risks, security measures 
and benefits, payments and disbursements of all processes affected by a desig-
nated bundle of measures are determined. Existing approaches were integrated 
into a generic proceeding model for IT-risk management. In addition to that the 
necessity of a distinction between such methods for regular and critical business 
processes was shown. After a refinement of the procedure for critical business 
processes requirements for decision support in this context were developed. 
Future research should focus on the development of a criteria catalogue for 
critical infrastructure.  
Analysis of critical processes 
Decision support by process analysis (Grob et al. 2008)
Decision support for critical processes and infrastructures
. Risk Analysis Risk Governance Risk MonitoringRisk Identification XOR
process critical 
process not critical 
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INTRODUCING PROCESS MANAGEMENT IN E-GOVERNMENT 
AND HEALTHCARE 
 
Відкритий сектор економіки має, у порівнянні з іншими секторами, відносно недостатньо 
розвинену структуру інформаційних систем. У цьому контексті є сенс вважати важливими 
зниження витрат та спрямлення робочих потоків. Проте, незважаючи на важливість управ-
ління процесами, у теперішній час є дуже мало керівних документів, які допомагають впро-
вадити управління процесами у користувальницьку адміністрацію. Мета цієї роботи – дати 
огляд можливої інфраструктури для аналізу проектів з управління процесами. Шляхом вико-
ристання цієї інфраструктури ми аналізуємо систему управління у Болгарії та адмініструван-
ня охороною здоров‘я у Ірландії. Наш аналіз дав деякі цікаві результати.  
 
The public sector has shown that it has, compared with other sectors, a relatively underdeveloped 
information system structure. In this context the importance of reducing costs and streamlining 
workflows and processes is ever more recognized. However, despite the importance of process 
management, currently there are internationally very few guidelines provided for introducing proc-
ess management in public administration. The objective of this paper is to outline a framework for 
analyzing process management projects. By using this framework we analyze a system in the public 
administration of Bulgaria as well as an implementation of a healthcare administration system in 
Ireland. Our analysis revealed some interesting results. The reasons for failure in public administra-
tion are rather content and structural in nature then solely project management issues. 
 
1. Introduction. In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public sector a number of reform initiatives emerged over the last two decades 
[6]. Influenced by the rapid advancement of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) the introduction of effective information systems became 
the primary mean for increased efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. 
In order to modernize public management many organizations have imple-
mented new ICT systems. Innovative solutions for communicating with citizens 
are broadly referred to as electronic government (e-government), digital gov-
ernment, electronic administration [2] or in the case of healthcare e-health. In 
this context many organizations and researchers emphasize the importance of 
introducing process management and redesigning processes. Among many 
challenges, most stress interoperability of information and communication sys-
tems and the link to processes that they support as crucial [32].  
The concept of interoperability encompassed interactions at local, national 
and international level. It requires organizational, semantic and technical inter-
